In this paper we develop an interbank market with heterogeneous nancial institutions that enter into lending agreements on dierent network structures. Credit relationships (links) evolves endogenously via a tness mechanism based on agents performance. By changing the agent's trust on its neighbor's performance, interbank linkages self-organize themselves into very dierent network architectures, ranging from random to scale-free topologies. We study which network architecture can make the nancial system more resilient to random attacks and how systemic risk spreads over the network. To perturb the system, we generate a random attack via a liquidity shock. The hit bank is not automatically eliminated, but its failure is endogenously driven by its incapacity to raise liquidity in the interbank network. Our analysis shows that a random nancial network can be more resilient than a scale free one in case of agents' heterogeneity.
Introduction
Interbank markets allow exchanges among nancial institutions, facilitating the allocation of the liquidity surplus to illiquid banks. Notwithstanding, the global nancial crisis, burst in August 2007, has shown the dark side of interbank connections. After the default of Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns, it became incontrovertible that the available tools to respond to the nancial crises have not been necessarily adequate as previously thought ( (1), (2)). This has explained the increasing concern of policy makers to nd new analytical tools able to better identify, monitor and address the systemic risk and the crisis transmission. Furthermore, many scholars and practitioners have brought to the fore a crucial question, which motivates our paper, namely what architecture of the global nancial system could increase or decrease the emergence of systemic risk ( (3), (4)) and how systemic risk emerges from the interaction and evolves over time. When things go wrong, in fact, nancial linkages among highly leveraged banks represent a propagation channel for shocks and a source of systemic risk. In this respect, our work follows models where local shocks can also have systemic repercussions ((5), (6) , (7)) and, thus, diverges from the common idea that big crises need big shocks.
The most important strand of research has traditionally focused on three types ofnancial distress propagation: (a) self-fullling panic, i.e. bank runs ((8) , (9) , (10) , (11) ); (b) the asset price contagion((12), (13) ); (c) interlocking credit exposure, i.e. nancial contagion ((13) , (14) , (6) , (7) , (15) , (16) ).
As recent events have shown, these channels interact and reinforce each other during nancial crisis ((17) , (18) , (19) ).
Recent economic models have underlined advances in modeling credit markets as complex systems by using network theory for studying the resiliency and robustness of dierent interbank architectures (see (13) , (16) , (20) , (21) , (22) ).
Following this approach, in this paper we study a credit network and, in particular, an interbank system, in an agent-based model. In contrast to the mainstream assumption that nancial operators are anonymous players, this paper moves from the empirical evidence that banks establish "personal" relationships, or links, to negotiate in the interbank market. In our model, links are "preliminary lending agreements" able to provide liquidity to banks in need.
These nancial connections might change over time, so modifying the interbank network structure (topology). The originality of this work respect to previous mentioned models on interbank networks is in the credit linkages evolution. We implement an endogenous mechanism of links formation, via a preferential attachment rule ((23)), such that each nancial institution can enter into a lending agreement with others with a probability proportional to its prot. This method, based on a tness parameter given by bankÕs expected prot (see (24) ), is able to reproduce 2/23 UNIVERSITÀ POLITECNICA DELLE MARCHE Simone Lenzu a , Gabriele Tedeschi b : Systemic risk on dierent interbank network topologies dierent network structures ranging from the random graph to the power-law one. Moreover, to better determine the links capacity to carry liquidity to nodes, we model the interbank market as a 'ow network': a simple directed network with specic constraints (lending capacities) on the maximum liquidity owing though established links. In particular, the Ford and Fulkerson theorem (see (25) , (26) ) allows us to determinate the liquidity ow between any pair of banks in the market.
Each time period, we perturb the system with two random liquidity shocks of equal magnitude but opposite sign and we test the ability of nancial linkages to act as liquidity conduits between the illiquid node (i.e agent hit by the negative shock) and the liquidity one (i.e agent hit by the positive shock). The illiquid bank can try to borrow from nancial institutions it has previously entered into agreements with. If lending takes place and the bank manages to scrape together enough cash to meet with the liquidity shock then it survives, otherwise it goes bankrupt. As the nal borrower (sink) and the initial lender (source) may be linked together through a chain of intermediate nodes, the failure of the borrower bank can bring about a cascade of bankruptcies among banks. Following physical and economic literature (see for instance (13) , (16)), thus, we induce a random attack via a liquidity shock, but the hit bank is not automatically eliminated: the bankruptcy is endogenously driven by the node's capacity to rise liquidity in the interbank network.
This theoretical framework allows us to study which graph proprieties better anticipate the contagious eect and the network topology more robust to attack. Our results suggest that the scale-free network is more vulnerable to random attacks than the Poisson graph. We nd two important explanations for this unexpected result. On the one hand, in accordance with empirical analysis (see (27) , (28) , (29) , (30) ) and theoretical model (see (6) ) the failure of one bank has strong knock-on eects on its creditors just in case of heterogeneous agents. Our model is able to generate a fat tail distribution of banks' wealth and, thus, a strong heterogeneity in market participants' size when the interbank conguration moves toward the scale-free network.
On the other hand, the random graph compared with the scale-free one has a tendency to "condense", forming regions of the graph that are essentially complete communities-subsets of vertices within which many possible lending paths (edges) exist. In this case, at least one path between the nal borrower and the initial lender exists, so decreasing the probability of bank's failure. The model represents a stylized interbank network describing the dynamic evolution of credit relationships (links) among nancial institutions.
In order to meet with exogenous liquidity shocks, banks enter into Potential Lending Agreements which allow the liquidity exchange among market participants. These contracts are revised each time period on the basis of banks' expected performance. In particular, we implement an endogenous 'tness mechanism' able to generate dierent dynamic network topologies.
To test the network capacity to ow liquidity and its resilience, we perturb the interbank market with random attacks. Hit banks (i.e borrowers) try to get funds from nancial institutions they have previously entered into lending agreements with. If contacted banks have not enough supply of liquidity to satisfy the borrowers' request, then they exploit their interbank connections, asking for money from their linked neighbors. If borrowers are able to fulll their needs, they survive, otherwise they go bankruptcy. As contacted banks, in case of shortage of liquidity, may enter the interbank market, the failure of borrower banks could lead to failures of many lender banks. The source of the domino eect may be due to direct interactions between lender and borrower banks, on one side, and to indirect interaction between bankrupt borrowers and their chain of lending banks, on the other side. Failed nodes are then removed from network and replace with new ones.
Banks' nancial structure
We consider a sequential economy operating in discrete time, which is denoted by t = {0, 1, 2, ...}. At any time t, the system is populated by a large number N of active banks belonging to the nite set Ω t = {i, j, k, ...}. Agents are interconnected by credit relationships represented by the set D t , whose elements are ordered pairs of distinct banks. Banks (nodes or vertices) and their relationships (edges or links) form the nancial network G t (Ω t , D t ).
Each bank 1 has an Inter-day balance sheet structure dened as
where a t i , s t i and e t i represent, respectively, long term assets, short term debt and equity of bank i in time t. Given this balance sheet structure, we assume that no liquidity is immediately available 1 At the time t = 0, our economy is populated by homogeneous banks randomly linked to each other. 4 Similarly, banks' liquidity needs are exogenously generated as negative shocks, which represent the maturity of the short term debt s of nancial institutions. To face with it, agents trade in the "overnight" interbank market. All nancial positions opened in t must be closed at the end of the same day. The intra-day budget constraint is given by:
with r t i interbank credit and l t i interbank debits in time t.
Credit Agreements & the network formation mechanism
In order to deal with their liquidity needs, at the beginning of each day t, agents meet in the market and enter into bilateral potential lending agreements (PLAs) which represent directed We implement a preferential attachment based on a tness parameter given by lender's expected prot 5 .
2 Our interbank market is a zero-liquidity system, meaning that at the beginning and at the end of each period, banks hold no liquidity. 3 This assumption allows us to dene a ow function in our network and solve the maximum-ow problem by using the simple Ford-Fulkerson method. In a forthcoming paper we will extend the analysis allowing banks to hold liquidity. In that context, thus, we will use a more general denition of ow network and ow function. 4 Out-going links show the number of borrowers each lender can link with. In-coming links show the number of lenders each borrower can have. 5 Expected prots are function of the bank's default probability. 
where p j is the borrower's default probability, R is the gross interest rate, c is the maximum amount bank i is willing to lend to j, α is the liquidation cost of assets pledged as collateral and δ is the lender's opportunity cost of establishing a PLA. The rst term of Eq. (3) shows the expected revenue if the borrower repays its obligation, the second term the expected revenue in case of the borrower's default (in this case borrower's collateral is sold) and the third term is the opportunity cost of the agreement.
The maximum amount lender i is willing to lend to j is the lending capacity 6 , c t i,j , dened as
where a t j are the assets pledged by borrower j to lender i as collateral and h t j is the borrower haircut 7 . The size of the borrower haircut, h t j ∈ (0, h max ], is inversely proportional to the agent's
We interpret the in-degree as a proxy for borrowers' credit rating. Intuitively, the higher the number of potential lenders bank j can rely on, the higher its chance to stay liquid (Lehman Brothers, Chapter 11 Examiner's Report 2010).
The decision to establish a PLA is taken, non-cooperatively, by lenders. The lender i considers the borrower j protable if E[Π t i,j ] ≥ 0. By imposing Eq. (3) equal to zero and solving it for p t j , we calculate the threshold probability of default p t i,j ensuring zero expected prots 8
6 P i∈Ω t \{j} c t i,j represents the maximum amount of liquidity bank j can rise in the nancial network. Note that the lending capacity is calculated as the maximum amount that lenders are willing to lend when borrowers pledge all their assets to secure the transaction. 7 The haircut is a percentage that is subtracted from the market value of an asset that is being used as collateral. The size of the haircut reects the perceived risk associated with holding the asset. 8 To ensure a consistent set of probabilities and that The higher p t j , the higher the expected prot, the higher the probability that lender i enters into a PLA with borrower j. As a measure of agents' attractiveness we dene their tness at time t as a function of their threshold probability of default (see example in Table 1 ):
Each agent i starts with d outgoing links (PLAs in lending position) with some random agents, and possibly with some incoming links (PLAs in borrowing position) from other agents.
Following an approach similar to (31), links are rewired at the beginning of each period, in the following way: each agent i cuts its outgoing link, with agent k, and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen agent j, with a probability P r
or keep its existing link with probability 1 − P r t i . The rewind algorithm is designed so that more protable borrowers gain a higher number of incoming links and thus have a higher probability to draw liquidity from a larger pool of lenders 9 . Nonetheless the algorithm introduces a certain amount of randomness, and links with more protable borrowers have a non-zero probability to be cut in favour of links with less protable agents. In this way we model imperfect information and bounded rationality of agents. The randomness also helps unlocking the system from the situation where all agents link to the same nancial institution.
The parameter γ ∈ [0, ∞] in Eq. (7) is the key element generating dierent network structures 10 .
It represents the signal credibility and answers the question how much banks trust on the information (expectation) about other agents' performances. For 0 < γ < 1 dierences in tness are 9 As in (31), this rewiring mechanism is also satisfactory from the conceptual point of view in that it fullls the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA). The odds of choosing agent j over agent k depend only on the characteristics of the two nodes, and are independent of any other third borrower in the market. 10 The control parameter γ has a physical meaning of 1/γ where γ is the temperature (i.e. the measure of random uctuations in the system). Following this interpretation, the dierent network topologies can be interpreted as a phases transition of the model due to the decreasing of the temperature. 
Liquidity shocks and interbank lending
Each time period t, two random banks receive a liquidity shock of equal magnitude but opposite sign. The negative shock arises from the maturity of the bank short-term debt, the positive one arises from an unexpected nancial prot of the bank and represents a liquidity surplus. The magnitude of the two shocks is
• ψ t j = s t i , if bank j ∈ Ω t \{i} has a positive shock,
The bank hit by the negative shock cannot raise funds by selling its assets, but only exploiting its In each time period, we are able to determine the maximum liquidity ow from the source (initial lender) to the sink (nal borrower), given the network topology and the set of eective capacities. In accordance with Ford & Fulkerson theorem (see Appendix B ), the maximum liquidity ow between source i and sink j equals the capacity of the cut with the minimum capacity. To clarify, consider the simple network structure in gure (1) . The agent 1 is the initial lender (hit by the positive shock) and 2 the nal borrower (hit by the negative shock).
11 The Eective lending capacity tells us how much liquidity each edge is able to carry and pass through. (1), the maximum liquidity ow from 1 to 2 is equal to 10+5, that is the sum of the minimum capacity of all paths running from these two nodes.
A bank unable to fully fulll its liquidity need before the end of the day defaults Banks' assets and equity evolve according to:
where Θ t i is the set of outgoing links of node i,Θ t i ⊆ Θ t i is the subset of outgoing links involved in the lending chain i → j, i.e. lender i's borrowers,Θ t i+ andΘ t i− , represent respectively the disjoint subsets of solvent and insolvent borrowers of node i 13 .
Simulations and results
The model is studied numerically for dierent values of the parameter γ in Eq 7. In the rst part, we focus the analysis on some properties of the network such as the topology and in-degree
distributions. Then, we analyze the eect of dierent network topologies on the dynamic of banks default cascades.
We consider a network consisting of N = 150 banks over a time span of T = 1000 periods. Each 12 Following this simple example, if the negative shock is equal to 16 bank 2 will go bankruptcy since the eective lending capacity of its lenders is 15 . If the shock is smaller or equal to 15 the bank survives. 13 It can be shown that Simulations are repeated 100 times with dierent random seeds. (35)), over 100 simulation. The table 2 shows the smooth transition from a random topology (low gamma) to a star (high gamma), evolving though exponential (medium-low gamma) and power law (medium-high gamma) structures. The existence of power law dependencies in bank's degree distributions is an important stylized fact of interbank markets ((36),(37)).
The network topology
Intuitively, when γ is high, the agents' behavior is characterized by herding, a phenomenon which occurs in situations with high information externalities, when agentsÕ private information is swamped by the information derived from directly observing othersÕ actions (see, for instance, (38) , (39)). In this circumstance, few borrowers gain the lion's share of lenders, attracting a high 14 A sensitivity analysis on the phase transition has not been performed, however the degree distribution gives a reasonable approximation of the critical behavior of our network model (see (34) An important dierence distinguishes our 'failure mechanism' from those commonly used in physical and economic literature (see for instance (40), (16)). All these models generate an exogenous random (or targeted) attack and study the consequences of removing a hit vertex on nodes connected to it and on the network structure. In line with these studies, we generate a random attack via a liquidity shock but, dierently from them, not necessarily the hit node is removed.
The failure depends endogenously from node's capacity to rise liquidity in the interbank market and, lastly, from the network topology.
As described in Section (2) Although the random network is characterized by a low signal credibility, it is more 'ecient' in re-allocating liquidity from banks in surplus to banks seeking funds. The increasing strength of the signal credibility shapes scale-free networks, which are more prone to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In this case, in fact, a small group of highly trusted agents emerges, leaving the others with very few (or none) potential lenders. In this circumstance, a borrower hit by the negative shock hardly belongs to the same cluster where the lender with excess liquidity is. The presence of many disconnected communities generates a higher possibility of rationing, but a lower probability of contagion, as shown in the right panel of Fig. (4) .
The idiosyncratic default risk depends not only on the interbank network topology, but also on the agents' characteristic. capacity for dierent γ. The transition from the random graph to the scale-free architecture is characterized by a sharp decrease of the median capacity, stable at zero for γ ≥ 12. Whereas, in the random network, agents have more or less the same capacity to conduct liquidity, when the network topology becomes power law just few big nancial institutions have a large capacity and many other nodes lose all the ability to transfer liquidity 18 . In this interbank structure, thus, borrowers hit by the liquidity shock have less chances to be connected to those few lenders able to provide them enough cash not to fail. Furthermore, whereas the median capacity decreases, the average capacity increases linearly with γ, suggesting a strong heterogeneity in the participants' size. Indeed, the heterogeneity may be an important source of idiosyncratic defaults ( (6), (43)). The fat tail distribution of the banks' size (g. 6 center), which shows that market participants are very heterogeneous in dimension as γ rises, conrms the positive 17 A geodesic path is the shortest path through the network from one vertex to another. Note that there may be and often is more than one geodesic path between two vertices. The diameter is the length (in number of links) of the longest geodesic path between any two vertices. The betweenness centrality of node i is the number of geodesic paths between other vertices that run through i. 18 Interestingly, the median decreases rapidly for γ greater than 4. This fast decay corresponds with the peak of failures for insucient ow (γ=6). 14 (27) ; (28); (29); (30) , for empirical analysis). The heterogeneity also plays a crucial role in the signing of PLAs: more protable borrowers have higher possibility to enter into agreements with many lenders. However, the decile of failed banks in-degree distribution (g.6 right side) shows that borrowers with many PLA may still fail. In particular, if failures for no-cash are characterized by few connections, those for insucient ow can also occur when banks are quite interconnected. This result underlines that, in our model, is not enough to stipulate many PLAs to avoid bankruptcies, but essential are both the conguration of the interbank network and the heterogeneity of market participants.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized the evolution over time of a credit network in the most general terms as a system of interacting banks. By implementing an endogenous mechanism of links formation, describing credit relationships, we have reproduced dierent interbank networks congurations ranging from the random to the scale-free one. The crucial question we have investigated is, how systemic risk emerges from the interaction and which network topology is more resilient against the random attack of vertices. To address this point we have perturbed the system with random liquidity shocks. Dierently from the standard literature, however, the hit node has been removed only if it did not scrape together enough liquidity in the interbank network to cope with the shock.
Our ndings have shown a higher vulnerability of the pawer-law network than of the random one. We have found motivations of this result in two key points. First, the scale-free network has self-organized itself into many disconnected clusters (communities), which have led to a sub-optimal liquidity reallocation among market participants, thereby increasing the default risk. On the other hand, the presence of many disconnected clusters might suggest that the scale-free network was less susceptible to domino eects. However, we have found that this was not the case. In fact, despite the agents' homogenous initial conditions, the scale-free network develops heterogeneous distributions through the interaction of noise and feedback eects. As commonly accepted in the literature, the heterogeneity among market participants has created a higher exposure of our network in case of attacks. This suggests that topology (rather than panics or direct knock-on eects) might be an important but neglected factor behind observed episodes of systemic failures. Obviously, this nding is specic to the model, but it oers an interesting further insight into the nature of contagion. 
Appendix A The Timeline of Events
In this appendix, we briey describe the assumptions and procedures we followed to simulate the model and rules to be iterated period after period. Figure 7 exemplies the timeline of events . • Stage 3: Lending Chain: Give the network topology, this "word-of-mouth" of requests may either reach the initial lender, or fade way. In the rst case, a lending chain is activated and the liquidity ows (initial lender) → ... → (f inal borrower) through the network.
The maximum liquidity received by the nal borrower (maximum ow) may (or not) fully satisfy its needs.
• Stage 4: Repayment chain and nal period network: If the liquidity reaching the nal borrower is enough to fulll its needs, it repays its obligations with its direct lender(s).
In this case a repayment chain starts, and all pending interbank lending are extinguished.
The initial lender thus uses the excess liquidity to buy new assets and adjusts its balance sheet ( Figure 7 , "Final Period Network" branch a). If the liquidity is not enough to fully satisfy the need of the nal borrower, it fails. In this case all its assets are uses to repay its creditors which incur credit losses. Whenever the lender equity is not sucient to absorb credit losses, it defaults in turn, potentially aecting its lenders nancial robustness ( Figure   7 , "Final Period Network" branch b). At the beginning of next period (t + 1) defaulted banks are replaced by new ones endowed with the modal balance sheet size.
Appendix B Flow Network and Flow Function
A ow network is a directed graph in which each edge has a nonnegative capacity (weight) associated with it. We distinguish two type of vertices: the source i and the sink j, which represent, respectively, the sender and the nal (potential) recipient of a liquidity ow. c. ∀u ∈ Ω\{i, j}: Θ(u) f (u, v) = Λ(u) f (v, u).
(Flow conservation)
We call the quantity f (u, v) net ow from node u to node v. The value of a ow is dened as |f | = u∈Ω t f (i, u), (11) that is, the total net ow out of the source.
Proposition 1
Given the source i and the sink j, the set of credit capacities c and the balance sheet constraints given in Eqs. (1)- (2), when R ≥ 1 19 , then a ow function f exists and governs the liquidity ow G = (D, Ω), for every period t.
Proof
To prove the existence of a ow function, we need to demonstrate that each constraint, above dened, is respected. a) Capacity Constraint: Between any given pair of nodes (u, v), the capacity function c determines the maximum amount of money u is willing to lend to v, given the total assets that v can pledge as collatera. The ow between these nodes corresponds to the eective lending f (u, v) =c t i,j ≤ c t i,j . 
